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Abstract 
Social media is a vortex of information and people may see distorted views of consensus, 
where the independence of information and sources is unclear. A tool that summarises 
consensus information might help people to navigate these important cues. This study 
examined whether a reasoning aid (in the form of a diagram) visually illustrating both the 
number of independent people supporting/disagreeing with a claim and the diversity of 
arguments would persuade people to change their original beliefs. Participants (n=605) were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to evaluate 24 claims on a mock Twitter 
interface. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions with either tweets only, diagram 
only or tweets with a diagram. Participants rated their initial agreement level (0-100) with 
each claim and then saw the diagram and/or set of tweets, then were able to update their 
agreement level if their original opinion had now changed. The findings of this study show 
that without assistance, people mostly rely on cues of argument quantity, such as the number 
of tweets for a given stance. However, when presented with a diagram, people were able to 
utilise cues of argument quality, such as when there were different sources providing the 
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Consider a claim such as “police should wear body cameras”, or “phone calls create 
stronger bonds than texts or emails”. What is the basis of your degree of belief in each claim? 
We do not have direct access to the relevant evidence for many of the claims we come across 
— for example, we probably have not personally studied police officers with or without body 
cameras, and although we may have personal experience with phone calls and social bonds, 
we probably have not systemically collected the relevant observations. Instead, we must rely 
upon indirect access to evidence through information from other people, which often includes 
arguments from people on social media. Reasoning based on information from social media 
adds a new level of complexity as there is an abundance of different quality information, but 
it is unclear how we weight argument quality. It is also unclear how sensitive we are to cues 
that suggest information is good quality, such as when there are different sources supporting 
the information or a wide variety of arguments reinforcing it.  
 
1.1 Category-Based Induction and Sampling Assumptions 
In relatively simple reasoning tasks, people determine the strength of arguments by 
utilising properties of the arguments themselves (Dowden, 2017). In category-based 
induction tasks, people view an argument in the form of a list of sentences, with any number 
of premises and one conclusion (Ranganath et al., 2010). The task usually requires a person 
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to utilise the premises in order to consider some kind of generalisation to the conclusion. For 
example, people may be asked to rate the strength of the argument, “horses have a merocrine 
gland and monkeys have a merocrine gland, so all mammals must have a merocrine gland” 
(Heit, 2000). Stronger arguments are considered arguments where the premises are more 
likely to result in people believing the conclusion. A larger number of premises that support 
the conclusion generally lead to more compelling arguments. Consider a scenario that 
discusses which animals possess “sesamoid bones”, which is referred to as property P. Giving 
three examples of animals that have P rather than only two examples of animals that have P 
has been shown to increase argument strength. However, it is important that the additional 
examples increase stimulus diversity, as similar examples add limited new information to 
guide generalisations (Osherton et al., 1990). For example, stating that both cows and sheep 
share P is not enough to conclude that all mammals share P because they are too similar. 
Cows and sheep are too typical and similar in nature, so both of them sharing P is not enough 
to generalise P to all mammals. In contrast, stating that horses and monkeys share P seems to 
add more strength to the conclusion that all mammals share P (Spellman et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, any additional arguments should be strong otherwise this could lead to the weak 
evidence effect. This occurs when weak arguments are added to strong arguments, thereby 
weakening the effect overall (Friedrich & Smith, 1988). For example, if a reference letter for 
a job candidate focuses on the candidate’s neat business attire this may weaken their overall 
application; even though dressing neatly is positive evidence for a good candidate, it implies 
a lack of stronger reasons. 
When reasoning, people are also known to take into account assumptions of how the 
examples were generated to decide whether the conclusion is believable. For example, 
consider two arguments: 1) “German Shepherds have P, therefore all dogs have P”; 2) 
“German Shepherds have P, Dobermans have P, Rottweilers have P, therefore all dogs have 
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P.” Interestingly, people tend to rate the first argument as more believable, even though it 
only has one example, perhaps due to the belief that the experimenter has purposefully 
provided maximally informative examples in each argument. This means that for the second 
argument, people believe P must only belong to larger, stereotypically aggressive dogs 
(Medlin et al., 2003). People may also assume that the examples are sampled at random from 
dogs that possess P. Since the three examples randomly selected all happen to be larger, 
stereotypically aggressive dogs, this could imply that it is statistically unlikely that all types 
of dogs possess P (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; see also Hendrickson et al., 2019; Perfors et 
al., 2014). 
However, real-life everyday reasoning is often far more complex. For example, 
imagine you came across a “trending” claim that “police should wear body cameras” on your 
Twitter feed. When deciding whether you agree with the claim, would you rely on the tweets 
that you saw, and/or how you assume the tweets were generated? Considering the tweets 
alone, compared to the simple category-based induction tasks, the structure of the conceptual 
space where this problem would be represented is far more complex (Ransom et al., 2021). 
The space is high-dimensional and there are fewer prior data to rely on when determining 
your stance on the issue. Assumptions of how the arguments in the tweets were generated 
also extend far beyond informative or random sampling (Ransom et al., 2021). It can be 
extremely difficult to determine which assumption applies, such as whether a person positing 
that police should wear cameras has any stake in this issue; perhaps they own a camera 
technology company. Sampling assumptions become even more complicated when 
considering the independence of individual arguments. If one person posts multiple times to 
Twitter, it is not clear whether they acquired and verified these arguments independently, or if 
they were derived post-hoc from the conclusion. In real-life scenarios it is also difficult to 
know the quality of an apparent consensus. If hundreds of people all have the same opinion, 
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did they generate this opinion independently, or did they all generate this same opinion 




1.2 Perceived Consensus 
A perceived consensus can be highly — and sometimes dangerously — influential; 
the number of people in favour of a claim is used as an important cue to believability. Classic 
research on conformity emphasises how people over-rely on the perceived consensus, even 
when this consensus is clearly wrong (Asch, 1956). Asch (1956) examined how people 
reasoned when all other participants in the room were confederates and gave an obviously 
wrong answer. People were shown a range of different lines, along with a target line, and 
were asked to select which line most closely matched the target line, answering in front of 
everyone (the real participant always chose last). The study found that 75% of people were 
willing to select an obviously incorrect answer at least once if the rest of the people in their 
group selected this wrong answer before them.  
 
1.3 Sensitivity to the Quality of a Consensus 
Although it is clear that a perceived consensus is a powerful cue that a claim should 
be believed, there is little research on people’s sensitivity to the quality of a consensus or 
whether people distinguish between different types of consensus, based on independent or 
dependent evidence (Yousif et al., 2019). To illustrate, imagine that you were unsure about a 
newly proposed policy and went around your office at work to find out your colleagues’ 
opinions. If every single co-worker you approached gave the same answer in support of the 
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policy, that might seem like a pretty convincing consensus. However, what if you found out 
that all of your colleagues received their information from the exact same source, rather than 
independently coming to this conclusion? Would this change your perspective on the 
apparent “consensus”, and if so, why? This scenario illustrates a “false” consensus, as even 
though it appears that there is a majority supporting the policy, there is actually only one 
known original source that supports it, and then a lot of repetition of this source (Yousif et al., 
2019). Interestingly, there are contradicting findings regarding whether people are able to 
utilise cues of consensus quality, or if they are persuaded by “false” consensuses (Harkins & 
Petty, 1981; Ransom et al., 2021; Yousif et al., 2019). 
Yousif et al. (2019) explored whether people were sensitive to the difference between 
a “true” consensus (based on independent primary sources) and a “false” consensus (based on 
a shared primary source) over five different experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were 
shown a range of news articles about a claim and were asked to rate their belief in the claim. 
The number of secondary sources (news articles) that contributed and the number of primary 
sources that were relied upon in the articles were varied. The results showed that people were 
not at all sensitive to the difference between a “true” or “false” consensus. This finding was 
repeated in Experiments 2, 3, 4 and 5, with this lack of sensitivity to consensus quality 
persisting through multiple manipulations. The lack of sensitivity occurred regardless of 
expertise, when participants were explicitly told to attend to the source(s), even when people 
made prior ratings that they preferred a true consensus, and for directly perceivable events 
(i.e., eyewitness accounts of a bear sighting).  
On the other hand, Harkins and Petty (1981) found that having three different people 
give different arguments in support of a claim was far more persuasive than one person 
giving three different arguments. Even though the exact same content and amount of 
information was presented, people were more sensitive to the number of different people 
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presenting the arguments. This shows that people were more compelled by diverse authors 
(equivalent to multiple “secondary” sources in Yousif et al., 2019), as a cue of a higher-
quality consensus. This supports an “argument of the pool” theory, whereby knowing that 
several different people generated a range of different arguments may have led reasoners to 
infer that there must be a large pool of reasonable arguments in support of the claim (Harkins 
& Petty, 1981). One person using different arguments does not imply this as the individual 
may have just exhausted the pool of reasonable arguments (Harkins & Petty, 1981).  
Ransom et al. (2021) also recently investigated whether people were more sensitive to 
the quantity of evidence, or the quality of evidence for a claim. Simply because there is a 
large quantity of evidence, such as an abundance of social media posts supporting a claim, 
does not mean this evidence is good quality. The researchers explored what cues to evidence 
quality people were sensitive to on social media; specifically, whether people were more 
sensitive to the number of posts made in support of a claim (quantity), or to cues of quality 
such as the number of people supporting a claim and whether they used diverse or repeated 
arguments to support a claim. Participants rated their initial agreement with a range of claims 
(e.g., “charitable giving will increase in the next three years”) on a scale of 1-100 and were 
then shown a sample of tweets arguing against or in favour of the claim. The level of support 
for each claim depended on the randomly assigned condition: full consensus (4 vs. 0 tweets), 
majority consensus (4 vs. 1 tweets) and contested consensus (4 vs. 4 tweets). Each trial, the 
tweets for a target stance (for or against) differed in whether they were written by different 
people or the same person and whether there were different arguments, or the same general 
argument repeated in each tweet. After viewing the tweets, participants had the chance to 
update their agreement rating. The study found that reasoners were most sensitive to quantity 
cues (number of tweets for vs. against the claim) and showed limited sensitivity to cues 
regarding the quality of information (people and argument diversity). In fact, reasoners were 
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slightly more persuaded when the tweets repeated the same argument than when there were 
different arguments, even when it was the same person tweeting the same argument multiple 
times.  
Concerningly, Weaver (2007) also found that people can be persuaded by the 
repetition of a single opinion. The study found that participants preferred when different 
people stated the same opinion; however, participants were more persuaded when one person 
repeated the same point multiple times than when a person stated the same point once 
(Weaver, 2007). This finding shows that people often infer that a repeated opinion is a 
prevalent one, even when this repetition comes solely from one group member and 
participants are indeed aware that it is only from one person (Weaver, 2007). If people treat 
repetition from one source as a cue suggesting that the opinion is widespread, this could have 
huge implications on social media, where people have the ability to post repetitively.  
 
1.4 Reasoning Tools on Social Media 
Together, the studies by Harkins and Petty (1981), Ransom et al. (2021), Weaver 
(2007) and Yousif et al. (2019) highlight that people do not seem to reliably attend to 
important cues about argument strength and consensus quality, and need help to make these 
cues more salient. This is critical on social media platforms where people encounter more 
information than they can evaluate systematically (Gunaratne et al., 2020). People do not 
have the cognitive capacity, motivation, or time to evaluate every piece of information they 
view online. The fact that low-credibility information is able to spread rapidly and easily 
suggests people are vulnerable to manipulation and in need of some type of reasoning aid or 
intervention to reason more effectively (Shu et al., 2017). Various social media platforms 
have attempted to address this issue through implementing warning labels on social media 
content that a third-party fact-checker has disputed (Koch et al., 2021). Fact-checkers have 
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the potential to significantly reduce the proliferation and impact of misinformation, through 
debunking false claims and influencing the likelihood users see misinformation (Allen et al., 
2021). 
However, there are doubts about the effectiveness of current fact-checking warnings 
as a third-party must examine every new piece of information to either verify or dispute it 
(Pennycook et al., 2020). This is problematic as it is significantly easier to create 
misinformation than it is to check its accuracy, meaning there will only be a limited amount 
of misinformation that is successfully labelled with warnings. Troublingly, when a warning is 
absent, it might create an “implied truth effect” and users may assume the information has 
been verified, even if it is inaccurate (Allen et al., 2021). Even when fact-checking warnings 
are successfully implemented, there is a lack of public trust in the objectivity of the warnings 
(Allen et al., 2021). However, Shu et al. (2019) found that fact-checker warnings would be 
significantly more trustworthy and effective if they offered explanations for their 
recommendations; specifically, if they included a sample of user posts that guided the 
refutation. Another limitation is that warning labels are generally only used on headlines that 
a third-party assesses to be blatant misinformation, which whilst is a serious type of 
misinformation, is far from the only form (Pennycook et al., 2020). These warnings do not 
consider more ambiguous types of information such as conspiracy theories that associate real 
events with nonsensical conclusions. Some information may also seem questionable but is 
not exactly debunkable; for example, claiming that “it will be impossible to find good quality 
avocados in 10 years”. 
 
1.5 Crowd-Sourced Reasoning 
The limitations of third-party fact-checkers have led to research into using the 
“wisdom of the crowds” effect to help people evaluate the veracity of information on social 
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media (Collins et al., 2021). This is a well-documented effect whereby independent 
judgements are aggregated to create a combined judgement with high accuracy (Simoiu et al., 
2019). The wisdom of the crowds effect has been reported in a wide variety of contexts and 
domains, such as answering general knowledge questions (Rauhut & Lorenz, 2011), 
identifying online phishing and scams (Moore & Clayton, 2008; Liu et al., 2012), and 
predicting COVID-19 mortality rates by region months in advance (Turiel & Aste, 2020). 
Pennycook and Rand (2019) explored whether the wisdom of the crowds effect could be 
utilised to judge online news sources. They found that crowd-sourced judgements accurately 
identified the reliable and unreliable news sources, and are more effective than fact-checkers 
as they are scalable (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Utilising the collective intelligence of online 
communities to discern questionable information could solve the problem of limited time and 
resources, whilst also avoiding issues with public trust of third-party fact-checkers (Collins et 
al., 2021). Researchers are currently working on automated fact-checking algorithms that 
uses a wisdom of crowds approach by utilising user posts (Shu et al., 2017). However, these 
algorithms will still struggle to establish ground truths for more ambiguous types of 
misinformation. 
 
1.6 A Novel Reasoning Aid  
The current study proposes a new type of tool to assist people to reason in a way that 
is better calibrated with the available evidence. This reasoning aid is based on the concept 
and design of multidimensional scaling (MDS) used (for example) to illustrate the similarity 
of categories in psychological space (Hout et al., 2015) and topic space visualisation 
diagrams (Ajjour et al., 2017). It is challenging to attempt to quantify heterogeneity 
(diversity) of arguments and reasoners. In MDS, the more diverse items are from each other, 
the more distance there is between them in space (see Appendix A). Topic space visualisation 
IMPACT OF AN AID ON EVALUATING CONSENSUS QUALITY                                19 
 
has also been used to represent the diversity of items (arguments), as seen in Ajjour et al. 
(2017). Ajjour et al. (2017) depicted the topic space (a controversial claim) through a regular 
polygon shape, with one vertex for each represented argument topic (see Appendix B). 
Coloured dots represent specific arguments (green dots for pro arguments and red dots for 
con arguments) and are plotted in the pentagon, where arguments that are closely related to 
an argument topic are plotted closer to the relative vertex(s). The current study uses distance 
to capture the diversity of arguments — similar/repeated arguments are represented by 
closely grouped icons, while dissimilar argument are more widely distributed. 
 
1.7 The Current Study 
This thesis aims to investigate the effectiveness of a new reasoning aid, designed to 
help people navigate cues to the quantity (number of posts) and quality (diversity of sources 
and arguments) of consensus information in a social media context. The reasoning aid draws 
on the concept of crowd-sourced judgements where lay-people have provided their agreement 
or disagreement with a claim and an argument or justification, so that a summary of this 
information potentially resembles a judgement of high accuracy. The reasoning aid created is 
in the form of a diagram that illustrates the number of different people supporting/refuting a 
claim, the number of Twitter posts these people made, and whether they used diverse 
arguments or repeated an argument multiple times in their posts. If shown to be effective, this 
kind of reasoning aid could be used alongside complementary tools such as automated fact-
checking services. 
The current experiment extends on the paradigm explored by Ransom et al. (2021) 
and investigates whether belief revision is affected by the number of tweets, whether there are 
different people or the same person tweeting multiple times and whether diverse or repeated 
arguments were used. This experiment also includes the addition of a diagram to explore how 
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making these factors salient through a visual representation affects, or more specifically, 
improves reasoning with the available evidence. The first aim is to replicate the key effects 
that without an aid, people are more sensitive to quantity than quality of consensus evidence. 
Some methodological improvements were also made to Ransom et al. (2021), such as 
controlling the total number of tweets across Pro and Con arguments. The second aim is to 
compare people’s reasoning when the reasoning aid is added to the posts. It is expected that 
the aid may improve sensitivity to the quality of a consensus. A third aim and condition 
explores the effect of the diagram alone, with no example tweets. This condition is expected 
to have less of an overall effect than the condition that includes the diagram with tweets, as 
summary statistics on consensus have been shown to be less effective than displaying 
example opinions (Harris et al., 2019). Overall, it is hypothesised that the reasoning aid will 
reduce the influence of the number of tweets relative to the effects of whether there are 
different tweeters and diverse arguments. The aid is also hypothesised to increase the 




















To examine the potential usefulness of a novel reasoning tool on social media, I 
conducted an online experiment in which participants viewed arguments supporting and/or 
refuting claims on a mock Twitter interface. I explored whether a reasoning aid in the form of 
a diagram would draw people’s attention to argument quality through visually representing 
the number of different tweeters and their tweets for/against each claim, and the number of 
different arguments used to support the target and opposing stances.  
 
2.1 Pre-Registration 
The study’s variables, hypotheses and planned analyses were pre-registered on 
AsPredicted before any data were collected (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=/6T9_769). 
 
2.2 Design  
The study used a 3 (INFORMATION LEVEL: TWEETS ONLY vs. DIAGRAM ONLY vs. 
TWEETS WITH DIAGRAM) × 3 (NUMBER OF TWEETS: FULL vs. MAJORITY vs. CONTESTED 
CONSENSUS) × 2 (ARGUMENT DIVERSITY: DIVERSE vs. NON-DIVERSE) × 2 (AUTHOR 
DIVERSITY: SAME TWEETER vs. DIFFERENT TWEETERS) factorial design, with the last three 
factors illustrated in Figure 1. INFORMATION LEVEL was varied between subjects, whilst 
NUMBER OF TWEETS, ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and AUTHOR DIVERSITY were manipulated 
within subjects.  
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2.2.1 INFORMATION LEVEL 
Participants assigned to the TWEETS ONLY condition saw the claims and a variety of 
tweets supporting/refuting each claim (see Figure 2). Participants assigned to the DIAGRAM 










Note. Participants were randomly assigned to an INFORMATION LEVEL group where NUMBER OF TWEETS, 
ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and AUTHOR DIVERSITY were manipulated within-subjects. The number of reply Target 
Tweets (T) versus Opposing Tweets (T’) varied by the NUMBER OF TWEETS, with either a FULL, MAJORITY or 
CONTESTED CONSENSUS. For T there was either one person tweeting multiple times or different people tweeting. 
They either repeated the same argument or used different arguments in their tweets. 
 
argument diversity and the number of different tweeters for each claim. The corresponding 
tweets were displayed on the screen (including tweeter information), but the tweet contents 
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were blurred out (see Figure 3). Participants in the TWEETS WITH DIAGRAM condition saw the 
claims, the diagram, and the reply tweets supporting/refuting the claim (see Figure 4). 
 
2.2.2 NUMBER OF TWEETS 
The number of reply tweets supporting either side of the claim was varied. There were 
three within-subjects levels: 6:0 tweets (FULL CONSENSUS); 5:1 tweets (MAJORITY 
CONSENSUS); and 3:3 tweets (CONTESTED CONSENSUS). In the FULL CONSENSUS condition, the 
reply tweets only consisted of Target Tweets with no Opposing Tweets (i.e., six tweets arguing 
in favour or against the target claim and no tweets opposing them). For the MAJORITY 
CONSENSUS there were a majority of Target Tweets (5) with one Opposing Tweet. There was 
no numerical advantage for the CONTESTED CONSENSUS as there were an equal number of 
Target Tweets (3) as there were Opposing Tweets (3). The current study added a 
methodological improvement to Ransom et al. (2021) by holding constant the total number of 
tweets across the FULL, MAJORITY and CONTESTED CONSENSUS conditions. Another 
methodological improvement was the manipulation of the NUMBER OF TWEETS within 
subjects, unlike Ransom et al. (2021).










Figure 3  
DIAGRAM ONLY Condition  
 
Figure 2 
TWEETS ONLY Condition  
 
Figure 4 
TWEETS WITH DIAGRAM Condition  
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2.2.3 ARGUMENT DIVERSITY  
Within-subjects, the tweets were manipulated to present either a range of different 
arguments or reword the same argument multiple times. The DIVERSE tweets clearly advanced 
different arguments (see Table 1), whilst the NON-DIVERSE tweets conveyed the same core 
message, with shared key-words to enhance similarity (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1 
DIVERSE Tweets for the Claim, “Perfect Avocados are Getting Harder to Find.” 
# Pro Con 
1. “As demand for avocados has increased 
they're now being grown in places that just 
aren't suited. So while average ones will 
be easier to find, the perfect avocado will 
disappear.” 
“Growers here in Tully can now get 500 
plants from a single cutting where they 
used to get one. So perfect avocados are 
becoming the norm as the best growing 
stock gets propagated.” 
2. “Perfect avocados are fresh avocados! But 
globalisation and the continuous demand 
to drive down costs means that more and 
more avocados are imported, spending too 
long in transit.” 
“With infrared scanning technology now 
being used to weed out bruised fruit before 
they get to the store I think the perfect 
avocado is getting easier to find.” 
3. “Monoculture crops like avocados 
gradually kill off the soil that supports 
them. Given that they can't grow 
everywhere it seems that high quality is 
not sustainable in the long run.” 
“The big supermarket chains have done a 
lot to improve the avocado by rewarding 
farmers for consistency and quality rather 
than just volume.” 
4. “These leather-skinned delicacies need 
precisely the opposite of what climate 
change provides to grow well. Avocados 
in California have already suffered from 
heat waves and drought.” 
“Genetic engineering will lead to the 
development of avocados that are more 
disease and drought resistant, improving 
the quality and quantity of crops grown in 
subtropical regions.” 
5. “Great avocados require a lot of resources 
and care, so economic cutbacks due to the 
“With social media hype increasing the 
demand for perfect avocados, market 
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pandemic will lead to lower quality 
produce.” 
forces will ensure that suppliers are 
motivated to deliver the goods.” 
6. “For goods like fruit and veg, there is 
always more profit in speed and high 
volume rather than quality, so the perfect 
avocado will gradually be replaced by 
tasteless rubbish.” 
“With the mild summer we just 
experienced, avocados are growing in 
abundance! There's more avocados so 





NON-DIVERSE Tweets for the Claim, “Perfect Avocados are Getting Harder to Find.” 
# Pro Con 
1. “These leather-skinned delicacies need 
precisely the opposite of what climate 
change provides to grow well. Avocados 
in California have already suffered from 
heat waves and drought.” 
“Genetic engineering will lead to the 
development of avocados that are more 
disease and drought resistant, improving 
the quality and quantity of crops grown in 
subtropical regions.” 
2. “Climate change will ruin everything, 
including the tastiness of my beloved 
avocados.” 
“Genetically engineered avocados will get 
better and better as we learn more about 
how to harness the power of DNA.” 
3. “With the way the climate is changing, the 
availability of good avocados will be 
impacted around the world.” 
“Perfect avocados will become the norm 
because of progress in genetic engineering 
to combat susceptibility to pests and the 
speed at which they decay.” 
4. “Climate change means that Mexico (the 
world's largest producer of avocados) 
stands to lose half its workable farms in 10 
years...” 
“The quality of avocados will only increase 
as farmers gain access to genetically 
engineered plants.” 
5. “The extreme weather events caused by 
climate change is making it harder to grow 
enough avocados to keep up with demand, 
let alone decent avocados.” 
“Support for genetically modified crops is 
on the rise, so we are sure to see an increase 
in the quality of avocados.” 
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6. “We're having more extreme weather 
events everywhere - climate change! 
Since avocados require a stable climate, 
perfect ones are going to get increasingly 
rare.” 
“Recent advances in genetic engineering 




2.2.4 AUTHOR DIVERSITY 
AUTHOR DIVERSITY for each claim was also manipulated within-subjects. The tweets 
would either come from a variety of DIFFERENT TWEETERS or the SAME TWEETER. A distinct 
user icon and name was randomly allocated and displayed alongside each tweet to convey 
this information (see Figures 2-4). 
 
2.3 Materials  
2.3.1 Claims and Tweets 
Participants were shown 24 Twitter posts containing claims about a range of topics 
(Table 3). The same 20 topics were used as Ransom et al. (2021) with four additional topics 
created by using arguments found online, including on debate sites and social media. The 
claims were chosen to vary in plausibility and nature; for example, opinion based, technical 
topics, or eyewitness accounts. For each participant the claims were randomly allocated to the 
conditions of AUTHOR DIVERSITY, ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and NUMBER OF TWEETS, such that 
there were two trials per cell. The stimulus set was expanded from that of Ransom et al. 
(2021) so that there were six diverse Pro tweets, six diverse Con tweets, six repeated Pro 
tweets and six repeated Con tweets for every claim (see Tables 1-2). Minor edits were made 
to some tweets to update them (e.g., to “Children learn more effectively by handwriting than 
by typing.”). 
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Table 3 
List of Claims 
# Claims 
1. “Police should wear body cameras.” 
2. “Golf is a sport.” 
3. “Phone calls create stronger bonds than text or emails.” 
4. “Children learn more effectively by handwriting than by typing.” 
5. “People are sleeping more during lockdown.” 
6. “Working from home is more productive.” 
7. “School uniforms are a good idea.” 
8. “Narcissists are more politically engaged.” 
9. “Genetically modified crops are a good idea.” 
10. “Manchester City fans started the fight.” 
11. “Perfect avocados are getting harder to find.” 
12. “Investment in clean coal technology will help the environment.” 
13. “Medical marijuana should not be used for pets.” 
14. “Charitable giving will increase over the next three years.” 
15.              “People are likely to be more tolerant toward other racial groups and 
nationalities having experienced a pandemic.” 
16. “The movie ‘Lofty Heights’ will be popular.” 
17. “Britain’s economy will improve as a result of Brexit.” 
18. “Standardised testing should be used more widely in schools.” 
19. “Hydraulic fracturing for gas production should be encouraged.” 
20. “Lockdowns should be abandoned.” 
21. “Capital punishment should be abolished.” 
22. “Advancing AI will do more harm than good.” 
23. “A college degree is worth it.” 




Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 step through the features of an example diagram. The diagrams 
summarise information about both the Pro and Con sides of the claim through green and 
purple colours, respectively. AUTHOR DIVERSITY is depicted through the number of green or 
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purple people icons for Pro and Con (see Figures 5 and 6). The NUMBER OF TWEETS is 
illustrated through the number of green (Pro) and purple (Con) speech icons (see Figures 7 
and 8). ARGUMENT DIVERSITY is shown via the number of Pro and Con labels and how 
spread out or clustered the speech icons are (see Figures 7 and 8). There were 12 different 
diagram types in total according to the three factors in Figures 5-8 and each diagram type was 
randomly jittered for each trial. 
 
2.4 Procedure 
Before the experiment, participants were given instructions on what the experiment 
involved (i.e., reading claims with reply tweets and making ratings) and were asked to 
complete three verification questions to 100% accuracy to make sure they read and 
understood the instructions. Participants who failed the verification questions were shown the 
instructions again. Participants also completed demographic information. Participants in the 
conditions with diagrams were then shown detailed instructions of how to interpret the 
diagrams and asked to complete three multiple choice questions to 100% accuracy before 
beginning the study. Participants who failed these verification questions were shown the 
diagram instructions again. 
There were 24 trials, each with a different claim such as “Perfect avocados are getting 
harder to find.” Each trial began by presenting a Twitter post with one claim, including a 
photo and some brief contextual information (see Figures 2-4). After reading the post, 
participants rated their agreement with the claim on a slider (0 = do not agree at all; 100 = 
fully agree). Participants saw a range of reply tweets to each claim, presented in random 
order (except in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition where the tweet contents were blurred). The 
reply tweets consisted of Target Tweets (T) and Opposing Tweets (T’), which were tweets that 
opposed the Target Tweets. All Target Tweets were randomly set either in favour (Pro) or 
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against (Con) the target claim for each trial and the Opposing Tweets took the relative 
opposing stance. All participants were then given the chance to update their agreement rating. 
Participants were unable to update or confirm their agreement level until they marked every 
tweet as “read” by clicking on each, which helped to ensure participants were actually 
viewing the tweets — this design feature was another methodological improvement to 
Ransom et al. (2021). All claims were presented in random order, except the last four claims 
in Table 3, which were new additions to the stimulus set (to permit more direct comparisons 
with Ransom et al. 2021, although such analyses are beyond the scope of this thesis). There 
were four follow up questions after each of the final four trials, which questioned the 
participants on what they had just seen in the previous trial. The questions examined 
participants’ understanding of the number of tweets, the number of people and the similarity 
of the tweets for a particular stance (“did the tweets seem to raise points in favour of the 
claim or against it?”; “did the people involved seem to agree or disagree with the claim?”; 
and “how similar were the tweets which argued against the claim?”). 
 
2.5 Participants 
Data for the current study were collected in August 2021 using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk platform. There were 605 participants that participated in the study and received $5 
USD as compensation. Participants were randomly allocated to the DIAGRAM ONLY (n = 199), 
TWEETS ONLY (n = 208) and DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS (n =198). Participants’ ages ranged 
between 19 and 78 (mean age 38.6), included 52.5% males and were drawn mainly from the 
U.S and Brazil (87.77%). The ethnic backgrounds of participants varied, with the majority of 
participants identifying as either White (70.58%), Asian (9.26%), Latinx (6.94%) or Black 
(6.78%). Most participants identified as native English speakers (79.01%), but all participants 
were previously screened for understanding the English language. The majority of 
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participants had high-school equivalent education or higher (99.17%) and identified 
politically as moderately liberal (23.97%). Participants were also asked about their social 
media use, specifically how often they use Facebook or Twitter. The most common response 
























































Note. There is one tweeter that supports this 
claim, circled in yellow. 
Figure 5 
Number of Tweeters for the Claim 
Figure 6 
Number of Tweeters Against the Claim 
Note. There are three tweeters that disagree with 
this claim, circled in yellow. 
 
Figure 7 
Number of, and Diversity of, Posts 
Supporting the Claim 
Note. Circled in yellow, there are three posts that 
have been made in support of the claim and every 
post has repeated the same argument.  
 
Figure 8 
Number of, and Diversity of, Posts Against 
the Claim 
Note. Circled in yellow, there are three posts that 
have been made against the claim and every post has 
used a different argument. 
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3.0 Results 
3.1 Prior Analyses  
An important assumption of the experimental design was that the topics selected for 
the claims would elicit a variety of prior distributions; people’s prior agreement levels would 
vary across claims and show a variety of distributions of belief. To verify this assumption, the 
prior ratings were plotted by topic (Figure 9). Prior beliefs varied widely across topics and 
people, allowing the study’s hypotheses to be tested under diverse conditions. 
To check for patterns of peculiar or random responding, people’s updated ratings were 
plotted as a function of their initial ratings for each INFORMATION LEVEL condition (Figure 
10). As expected, overall there was a positive correlation between people’s initial and updated 
ratings, r(1422) = .82, p < .001.  Furthermore, the plots also show clustering of the ratings 
from people who viewed Pro target tweets in the top left corner and the ratings from the Con 
target tweets in the bottom right corner, indicating that people generally understood and were 
affected by the stance (Pro/Con) of the tweets.  
 
3.2 Trial Duration  
The duration (seconds) for each participant to complete each trial was examined for 
each INFORMATION LEVEL condition to help assess whether participants were actually reading 
the tweets for each trial. An ANOVA showed that participants varied in the time it took to 
complete each trial, depending on which condition they were in. As some trial durations were 
very long (e.g., where people switched their attention away from the experiment) and others 
were very short, the trimmed “interquartile” mean (IQM) was used because this is less 
sensitive to outliers than the mean. Results showed a significant difference between the three 
groups (p < .001). Participants in the TWEETS ONLY condition had an IQM of 50 seconds (SD 
= .55 seconds) per trial. In the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition, the IQM was 48 seconds 
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(SD = .63 seconds) per trial. Participants in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition had an IQM of 30 
seconds (SD = .38 seconds) per trial. Pairwise comparisons between DIAGRAM ONLY and 
TWEETS ONLY conditions; and DIAGRAM ONLY and DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS conditions 
confirmed that the differences were significant (p < .001). In contrast, the DIAGRAM WITH 
TWEETS and TWEETS ONLY conditions were not significantly different (p = .31). Overall, these 
results suggest that participants were reading the tweets in the relevant conditions (TWEETS 









































Note. A linear model was conducted to determine whether there was any significant difference in the prior 
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Figure 10 












3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Agreement Ratings and Follow Up Questions 
 
To assess the extent to which people updated their beliefs about a claim on the basis 
of the tweets and/or diagrams presented, the difference (delta) between people’s prior and 
post ratings on a trial-by-trial basis was calculated.1   
In the TWEETS ONLY condition (see Figure 11), participants had the largest change in 
agreement rating in the FULL CONSENSUS condition, followed by in the MAJORITY CONSENSUS 
condition. When the Target Tweets were matched numerically by Opposing Tweets in the 
CONTESTED CONSENSUS condition, there was very limited change in the participants’ updated 
 
1 The difference between prior and post ratings (delta) was collapsed across Pro and Con target tweet trials, to 
examine the change in ratings after viewing the diagrams/tweets. The sign of delta was adjusted so that the 
interpretation of a positive value is consistent across Pro and Con tweets. 
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agreement ratings, even though the Opposing Tweets were always written by DIFFERENT 
TWEETERS and used DIVERSE ARGUMENTS, whilst the Target Tweets differed in diversity. 
Overall, people tended to have a higher change in agreement ratings when the tweets were 
written by DIFFERENT TWEETERS rather than the SAME TWEETER.   
In the DIAGRAM ONLY condition (see Figure 12), the largest change in agreement 
ratings occurred in the FULL and MAJORITY CONSENSUS when the tweets were written by 
DIFFERENT TWEETERS. In the CONTESTED CONSENSUS condition, people appeared to reverse 
their agreement rating, indicating they were sensitive to cues of ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and 
AUTHOR DIVERSITY, even when there was an even quantity of tweets (this is because the 
Opposing Tweets were always diverse). This also suggests that in this DIAGRAM ONLY 
condition people relied less on the NUMBER OF TWEETS as a cue to revise their agreement. 
In the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition (see Figure 13), the changes in agreement 
ratings were quite similar to that within the DIAGRAM ONLY condition. People had the largest 
change in agreement ratings in the FULL and MAJORITY CONSENSUS when the tweets were 
written by DIFFERENT TWEETERS. When there were an equal number of tweets for Pro and 
Con, there was sensitivity to AUTHOR DIVERSITY and ARGUMENT DIVERSITY (as was also 
seen in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition), meaning there was a reduced effect of NUMBER OF 
TWEETS. This suggests that the diagram is having an effect as when there is the addition of a 
diagram people seem to be more sensitive to cues of argument quality (i.e., ARGUMENT 
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Figure 11 









Note. The bars represent mean ± SE. 
 
Figure 12 










Note. The bars represent mean ± SE. 
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Figure 13 











Note. The bars represent mean ± SE. 
 
 
Taken together, Figures 12-13 suggest that people were more sensitive to cues of 
consensus quality when the diagrams made these cues more salient. An analysis of response 
accuracy to the follow-up questions quizzing participants on their recollection of the number 
of people, tweets and diversity of the final four trials supports this. To quantify the strength of 
evidence for an effect of condition on accuracy a logistic regression was performed. People 
were significantly more accurate in the DIAGRAM ONLY and DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS 
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Figure 14 










3.3 Linear Regression Models 
To quantitatively examine the strength of these findings, five nested linear models 
were compared, with the dependent variable of updated (post) rating. All linear models were 
fit within R (Version 4.0.3, R Core) using the built-in function lm from the ‘lme4’ package. 
Assumptions for linear regression were examined and were met. The first model is a baseline 
that assumes people’s agreement ratings are a function of their prior beliefs and this model 
accounted for 68.2% of variance, F(1, 14422) = 30880, p < .001. The second model adds the 
predictor NUMBER OF TWEETS to see whether people revise their agreement based on the 
quantity of tweets they view on each side of a claim, and this model accounted for 73.8% of 
variance, F(2, 14421) = 20,260, p < .001. The third model adds AUTHOR DIVERSITY as a 
predictor to explore whether people are also sensitive to whether different people post to 
Twitter, rather than one single person tweeting many times, and this model accounted for 
74.2% of the variance, F(3, 14420) = 13,830, p < .001. The fourth model assumes that people 
will be additionally sensitive to ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and will revise their agreement 











Diagram with Tweets 
Condition 
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and this model also accounted for 74.2% of the variance, F(4, 14419) = 10,380, p < .001. 
Finally, the fifth model explores whether there is an interaction between the INFORMATION 
LEVEL and the three predictors, NUMBER OF TWEETS, AUTHOR DIVERSITY and ARGUMENT 
DIVERSITY, and this model accounted for 74.3% of the variance, F(10, 14413) = 4164, p 
< .001.  This was the preferred model as this model captures the data better and a summary of 
the results from all models are shown in Table 4. 
 As Table 4 shows, all predictors including the interaction terms were significant 
except for the TWEETS ONLY condition interaction with ARGUMENT DIVERSITY (Argument: 
Tweets).  
The regression analysis revealed an important qualitative reversal in the emphasis that 
people place on various cues. In the TWEETS ONLY condition, the analysis revealed that the 
quantity of tweets on each side of the argument had the biggest effect (β = 1.35), with the 
number of tweeters next (β = .68). This effect reverses in the diagram conditions. In the 
DIAGRAM ONLY condition, the effect of the quantity of tweets reversed (β = -.47) and 
sensitivity to the diversity of authors (β = .49) and the diversity of arguments (β = .49) 
increases. A similar reversal of regression coefficients was also seen in the DIAGRAM WITH 
TWEETS condition: for the quantity of tweets (β = -.31), the diversity of authors (β = .53) and 
the diversity of arguments (β = .45). 
To explore the size of the effect within Model 5, the “predict” R function was used to 
hypothetically compare two scenarios in all three information levels: 1) if there were ten 
more tweets whilst the number of tweeters and arguments were evenly balanced in the 
regression model; 2) if there were ten more tweeters and ten more arguments whilst the 
number of tweets, tweeters and arguments were evenly balanced in the regression model. 
The model predicts that an additional ten tweets leads to a change in agreement rating 
of 13.54 in the TWEETS ONLY condition compared to 8.81 in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition and 
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10.43 in the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition. Conversely, the model predicts that an 
additional ten tweeters and ten arguments leads to a change in agreement rating of only 5.45 
in the TWEETS ONLY condition compared to 15.24 in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition and 15.21 
in the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition. 
The first example highlights that participants in the TWEETS ONLY condition weighted 
the NUMBER OF TWEETS as an important cue for their agreement revision, whereas this cue 
had less importance in both diagram conditions. The second example shows the extra value 
that additional tweeters and arguments has in the diagrams conditions compared to the 
control condition (TWEETS ONLY). 
 
Table 4   
Nested Regression models  
  R2 B SE B t 
Model 1 .682       
Constant   6.29 .31 20.56*** 
Prior   .87 .01 175.72*** 
Model 2 .738       
Constant   6.55 .28 23.59*** 
Prior   0.86 .01 192.40*** 
No. Tweets   1.76 .03 55.42*** 
Model 3 .742       
Constant   6.58 .28 23.92*** 
Prior   .86 .01 193.96*** 
No. Tweets   1.19 .05 24.76*** 
Author   1.03 .07 15.95*** 
Model 4 .742       
Constant   6.59 .27 23.95*** 
Prior   0.86 .01 193.98*** 
No. Tweets   1.02 .07 18.88*** 
Author   0.69 .11 15.66*** 
Argument   0.17 .07 2.64** 
Model 5 .743       
Constant   6.60 .28 24.01*** 
Prior   .86 .10 194.09*** 
No. Tweets: Tweets    1.35 .10 13.69*** 
No. Tweets: Diagram   -.47  .14 -3.34*** 
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No. Tweets: Diagram+    -.31 .14 -2.19* 
Author: 
Tweets                                                                 
  .68 .11  6.20*** 
Author: Diagram   .49 .16 3.07** 
Author: Diagram+   .53 .16 3.33*** 
Argument: Tweets   -.14 .11 -1.23 
Argument: Diagram   .49 .16 3.07** 
Argument: Diagram+   .45 .16 2.85** 
Note. R2 = explained variance. B = regression coefficient. SE B = standard error of  
regression coefficient. ‘prior’ = an integer in the range 0-100 indicating the first (prior) agreement rating. ‘No. 
Tweets’ = Number of Tweets. ‘Author’ = Author Diversity. ‘Argument’ = Argument Diversity. ‘Tweets’ = 
Tweets Only Condition. ‘Diagram’ = Diagram Only Condition. ‘Diagram+’ = Diagram with Tweets Condition. 
*** =  p < .001. ** =  p < .01. * =  p < .05. 
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4. Discussion 
The current study aimed to explore whether including a diagram summarising the 
NUMBER OF TWEETS, AUTHOR DIVERSITY and ARGUMENT DIVERSITY would affect agreement 
revision relative to the control condition with no diagram. On the basis of the previous work 
by Ransom et al. (2021), it was apparent that without a reasoning aid, people struggle to 
utilise information signalling argument quality. This study replicated this finding in the 
control condition, TWEETS ONLY, where the biggest effect was of quantity: the NUMBER OF 
TWEETS on either side of a claim. In contrast, as hypothesised, including a reasoning aid 
reduced the overall effect of the NUMBER OF TWEETS and increased the difference in the 
persuasiveness of DIVERSE vs NON-DIVERSE arguments. This finding occurred even in the 
DIAGRAM ONLY condition where the tweet contents were blurred out, supporting the diagram 
drove the effect. These results indicate that people do prefer DIVERSE TWEETERS and DIVERSE 
ARGUMENTS over simple quantity cues such as the NUMBER OF TWEETS; they might just be 
less able to consider cues of quality without the assistance of an aid such as the diagram.  
 
4.1 TWEETS ONLY Condition  
The TWEETS ONLY condition was a replication of the study by Ransom et al. (2021), 
with slight methodological changes including controlling the total number of tweets across 
the NUMBER OF TWEETS conditions. However, Ransom et al. (2021) did find a perhaps 
surprising, very slight effect where the same person repeating the same argument was, if 
anything, slightly more effective than when the same person used different arguments. The 
current study did not find such an effect, which is likely due to the fact that it was so slight to 
begin with. This study also helps eliminate the worries Ransom et al. (2021) had regarding a 
potential weak evidence effect. As their study had little to no effect of argument diversity, it 
was proposed that this could have been due to a methodological flaw where weaker 
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arguments were unintentionally included amongst stronger arguments, thereby signalling to 
participants that there are not many strong reasons to support the claim. However, the current 
study included additional diverse arguments (up to six rather than four), which would have 
only amplified the weak evidence effect if it existed – because creating more arguments 
increases the likelihood that one or more of these arguments are weaker than the others. This 
indicates that the limited effect of argument diversity was likely because people were not 
sensitive to ARGUMENT DIVERSITY without the assistance of an aid, which is made more 
salient in the conditions with diagrams, where effects of ARGUMENT DIVERSITY were found. 
The TWEETS ONLY condition findings have added to the conflicting literature regarding 
people’s sensitivity to cues of a quality consensus. The findings lend support to the studies by 
Ransom et al. (2021) and Yousif et al. (2019) that found people were not sensitive to cues of 
consensus or argument quality, such as whether people use different arguments to support a 
claim. The current study also supported Weaver (2007) and the effect of repetition. The 
largest effect was NUMBER OF TWEETS, but these tweets were sometimes all written by the 
SAME TWEETER. This means, for instance, that people still considered the same tweeter 
posting five Pro tweets versus one tweeter posting one Con tweet a consensus in favour of 
the Pro side, despite it only being an effect of repetition (compared to when different 
arguments were used).  
 
4.2 Addition of a Diagram  
Adding a diagram made people more sensitive to ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and AUTHOR 
DIVERSITY, with a reduced effect of the NUMBER OF TWEETS on either side of the claim. The 
fact that people were less sensitive to the NUMBER OF TWEETS when a diagram was present 
indicates that the diagram successfully promotes awareness of cues of argument quality. Cues 
about apparent consensus levels (such as the quantity of tweets supporting or refuting a 
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claim) do not seem to involve deep processing (Martin, 2002). Martin (2002) suggests that 
this may be because people want to belong to the majority group without actually processing 
the message, or they may be using a simple persuasion heuristic, such as that the majority is 
more likely to be correct than the minority. However, the diagram may have encouraged 
deeper processing of the tweets and cues of argument quality, which also reduced the effect of 
quantity cues.  
The current study also builds upon the work by Yousif et al. (2019), including the 
troubling and consistent finding that people were unable to distinguish between a “true” and 
“false” consensus over five different experiments. What was especially unusual about the 
Yousif et al. (2019) findings, was in Experiment 4 participants were explicitly asked to rate 
whether they favoured a news article that used unique sources of information (true 
consensus) or an article that cited the same source (false consensus). However, even the 
participants that rated that they preferred the news article with unique primary sources still 
fell prey to the false consensus in the actual experiment. In contrast, the current study 
suggests that people do prefer a true consensus (when there are multiple people supporting 
the claim) to a false consensus (when the same person posts multiple times), but are lacking 
sensitivity to this cue if it is not highlighted for them during the reasoning task. This is likely 
why there was a major effect of argument quantity in the TWEETS ONLY condition, but strong 
effects of argument quality with reduced effects of quantity when a diagram was present. A 
reasoning aid seemed to help draw people’s attention to whether there were multiple tweeters 
and whether they used a range of different arguments, rather than repetition of one tweeter or 
argument. In short, people are capable of incorporating these cues to consensus quality when 
they reason, but need support. 
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4.3 Comparing DIAGRAM ONLY and DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS Conditions 
Surprisingly, there were similar effects observed in the DIAGRAM ONLY and DIAGRAM 
WITH TWEETS conditions. It was hypothesised that the DIAGRAM ONLY condition would have a 
much smaller effect of ARGUMENT DIVERSITY and AUTHOR DIVERSITY than the DIAGRAM 
WITH TWEETS condition as it was missing the contents of the tweets. The DIAGRAM ONLY 
condition displayed a diagram with up to six people and six post icons in it (along with the 
tweeter names and photos, etc.); in contrast the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition had more 
information participants could utilise, as they were able to see both the contents of the tweets 
and the diagram summarising some of this information (stance and diversity of arguments). 
There are a few potential reasons why these conditions had very similar results. It could be 
due to the diagram training module shown prior to the experiment for both conditions. The 
training showed participants the diagrams and the tweets, highlighting specifically how these 
two features are interconnected. Participants in the DIAGRAM ONLY condition thus had a sense 
of the ARGUMENT DIVERSITY that was captured by the diagrams. Participants may have felt 
confident enough in how the diagram operated to not need to view the contents of any tweets 
(i.e., they knew they had all the information they needed). Another potential explanation 
could be that in the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS condition, the participants simply did not utilise 
or read the tweets, as the diagram was displaying much of the important information found in 
the tweets anyway. However, further analyses showed that this is likely not the case as 
participants in the DIAGRAM WITH TWEETS and TWEETS ONLY conditions took significantly 
longer time to complete each trial than the DIAGRAM ONLY condition, indicating that 
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4.4 Diversity of Tweeters and Arguments 
The finding that only showing a diagram was enough to alter participant’s agreement 
levels with a claim directly shows that people understand the value of higher argument 
quality, such as a “true” consensus based on the number of authors and when there are 
diverse arguments. The category-based induction literature has shown that people seem to 
follow a diversity principle where diversity amongst the stimuli is more compelling evidence 
of conclusions (Ranganath et al., 2010). However, the category-based induction literature 
only seems to highlight this sensitivity indirectly as it does not explore whether people are 
explicitly aware of a connection between diverse arguments and argument strength (it only 
shows people two sets of arguments and asks them which set better supports the conclusion). 
The current study has shown through the DIAGRAM ONLY condition that people are aware of 
the value of diverse arguments. When the only information accessible to people were icons 
signalling how many posts there were, how many people were posting and whether the 
arguments were diverse, people were more compelled by DIVERSE ARGUMENTS and 
DIFFERENT TWEETERS. This finding demonstrates that people are in fact aware that DIVERSE 
ARGUMENTS is a stronger cue of argument strength or quality. Comparisons to the category-
based induction literature also suggest that people may need more help in utilising this cue 
for more complex arguments - perhaps it takes extra effort to extract the more high-
dimensional diversity when reading the tweets. It is important to note that the category-based 
induction literature’s conception of the diversity principle is relatively different to the 
argument diversity discussed in the current study. Diversity in category-based induction 
explores how well the exemplars cover a category (i.e., how adding different premise 
examples strengthens the conclusion). However, the current study explores how a diversity of 
reasons strengthens agreement with a more complex claim. Nonetheless, it is interesting to 
report a similar finding that diversity is compelling in the different domains.  
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4.5 Strengths of the Current Study 
The successful replication of Ransom et al. (2021) is one fundamental strength of this 
study. As previously mentioned, the current study has some methodological improvements, 
but still replicated the key original findings. This indicates that these results are relatively 
reliable. The methodological improvements are also a strength of the current study; I ensured 
participants spent the same amount of reading time in all conditions that displayed tweets, by 
having an equal total number of tweets in the FULL, MAJORITY and CONTESTED CONSENSUS. 
Another methodological improvement from Ransom et al. (2021) was the manipulation of 
NUMBER OF TWEETS within subjects. This also kept the reading time and effort consistent as 
all participants experienced an equal assortment of FULL, MAJORITY and CONTESTED 
CONSENSUS trials throughout the study. 
The current study built upon the work of Ransom et al. (2021) through novel research 
on including a reasoning aid. To my knowledge, this kind of aid has not been used in a 
complex reasoning domain such as the current study. The reasoning aids were based on 
careful design features such as using distance to convey diversity (Ajjour et al., 2017; Hout et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, there are a wide variety of topics across the different claims in the 
study, which strengthens the generalisability of the findings; the results cannot just be due to 
one particular claim being important to participants, or particular domain knowledge. All 
claims also had randomised Pro and Con target arguments, and there was thorough 
randomisation of many other aspects of the stimuli (e.g., tweeter names and photos) and 
presentation order.   
 
4.6 Applied Implications 
The findings of the current study have significant real-world implications. It is clear 
that without support, people do not consistently utilise cues of argument or consensus quality 
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— at least for the kind of claims included in the study. This is especially concerning in an era 
where social media is a dominant source of information for many people. Social media has 
made it even more challenging to reason rigorously, with a constant flow of new incoming 
information, numerous contradicting opinions, visual cues about social support (such as 
“likes”) and an abundance of misleading information. Concerningly, the visual cues about 
support for information are often distorted and not truly representative on social media, 
because they are affected by bots or over-active minority opinions (Lee et al., 2021). 
Algorithms only further perpetuate this issue through prioritising certain content, making it 
appear more salient and widely accepted than the content may actually be (Zimmer et al, 
2019). It is clear that people need assistance in reasoning in a way that is better calibrated 
with the available evidence on social media. 
Unfortunately, the current reasoning tools in place to help people reason more 
effectively on social media (fact-checkers) can be ineffective and even counterproductive 
(Allen et al., 2021). The reasoning aid in the current study has shown promising potential in 
assisting people to utilise cues of consensus quality. As this reasoning aid uses the wisdom of 
the crowd approach, it avoids many of the issues associated with the currently used fact-
checkers. If the diagrams could be successfully automated, the aid could be easily utilised as 
it uses crowd-sourced opinions and does not need a third-party to individually assess every 
questionable claim on social media. Crowd-sourced judgements can be extremely accurate 
and are also viewed as trustworthy as they utilise the general public rather than specific 
agencies (Collins et al., 2021; Simoiu et al., 2019). This type of reasoning aid could be an 
important reasoning intervention for people when they are using social media platforms. The 
diagrams could augment or be used in conjunction with other automated fact checking tools 
that are being developed by computer scientists (see Shu et al., 2017). 
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4.7 Limitations of the Current Study 
The current study was not without its limitations. All of the tweets were written by the 
research team and designed to be fairly consistent in plausibility and writing style, but may 
have had weaknesses. The manipulation of DIVERSE versus NON-DIVERSE arguments may 
have been vulnerable to human error as some of the claims may have had NON-DIVERSE 
arguments that were not similar enough, or DIVERSE ARGUMENTS that were not diverse 
enough. The actual saliency of the repetition or diversity of tweets may have influenced 
participants’ sensitivity for particular claims (i.e., if tweets were not diverse enough for a 
claim, participants may have been less sensitive to ARGUMENT DIVERSITY as a cue of 
consensus quality). Another issue was that because of the sheer size of the stimulus set, the 
NON-DIVERSE repeated argument tweets were not fully randomised. There were not repeated-
argument tweets for all six possible diverse arguments; only one of the DIVERSE ARGUMENTS 
was selected and repeated another five times (eg. see Table 1-2). Thus, the repeated 
arguments may vary in how compelling they are relative to the other five arguments within a 
tweet set, which could either reduce or enhance any effect of argument diversity. 
All tweets for a topic were presented together; however, in real life, information is not 
necessarily encountered all together and is generally accrued over time. Post ratings were also 
made immediately after viewing all of the information, so it is unclear whether the shifts in 
belief would be enduring for a longer timeframe. The fact that the study required participants 
to provide an updated rating could have also led to demand effects; participants knew there 
was an expectation for them to have a change in rating. Therefore, real belief revision may be 
smaller or require more evidence. 
The demographic data also highlights that there was a political bias skewed towards 
Liberal orientation. This may limit generalisability, especially as research shows that people 
utilise quantity cues or quality cues of consensus depending on the relevance of the 
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information to them. When people read claims that are irrelevant to them, the number of 
arguments, but not the quality of the arguments, is most important (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
When people read claims relevant to them, they are influenced by the number of arguments, 
but also the quality of these arguments; simply adding numerous weak arguments does not 
increase persuasiveness (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). However, the variety of the topics, along 
with the fact that the target stances on the topics randomly varied in whether they were in 
favour of or against the claim, would limit any effect of demographic skew in political 
identity.  
 
4.8 Future Directions 
Firstly, it is essential to address the importance of replication in Psychology, 
especially with novel research. The current study needs to be repeated as, from my 
knowledge, there is no other study that uses a diagram representing consensus quality cues to 
help people reason. Even though the findings of this study were extremely promising, the 
results still need to be verified through replication. 
There are many outstanding research questions for future studies to explore. It would 
be interesting to see the effect of scaling the reasoning aid. To do this, the people and tweets 
represented in the diagram could be scaled to, say, 100 and be presented with a sample of 
tweets that represent the overall consensus quantity and quality information. This would 
slightly shift the purpose of the diagram into a tool that has a more comprehensive 
representation of the overall consensus information, not just mirroring the information from 
the small sample of tweets. The sample of tweets would then reinforce the information found 
in the diagrams and perhaps allow people to draw stronger conclusions, calibrated with the 
available evidence. A study exploring the scaling would advance the current study’s findings 
on the usefulness of a reasoning tool where people had even more information accessible to 
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reason with (i.e., there are now 100 people’s agreement levels with the claim to consider, not 
just six).  
There is also potential scope to include other cues of consensus quality in the 
reasoning aid that were not addressed in the current study. For example, it may be important 
to explore the role of expert opinion, which elicits more processing of persuasive messages 
(Clark et al., 2011). It is widely acknowledged that people expect expert sources to provide 
high-quality, valid information (Clark et al., 2011). It would be interesting to see how 
differentiating between lay-person and expert sources would impact the perception of the 
reasoning aid: would it negate the trust in the wisdom of the crowds approach that only uses 
lay-people’s opinions? It could also be useful to highlight distinctions between the similarity 
of the people, which could be another important cue of consensus quality. For instance, if all 
of the people represented in the diagram are similar, such as the same gender, political 
affiliation, or ethnicity, the represented consensus may not be good quality or very reliable. 
Researchers could manipulate the diversity of the features of the sources to explore whether 
people are not only sensitive to whether different people are sources of information, but 
whether these people also have diverse features or qualities. Effects of source-similarity could 
also be investigated through highlighting certain features of the social network structure. For 
example, a diagram could depict how people are connected on social media. If people are 
following each other on Twitter or in the same Facebook “groups”, they might not be truly 
independent sources of information. Furthermore, future studies could expand on the effect of 
repeated arguments through showing the repeated arguments as shares or ‘retweets’ of 
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4.9 Conclusion  
The findings from this study suggest that people readily rely on cues of consensus 
quantity and are not inherently sensitive to cues of consensus quality unless they receive 
assistance from a reasoning aid. Without an aid, people focused on how many tweets they 
saw supporting or refuting a claim. This is not necessarily a strong cue of consensus quality, 
as these tweets may have been written by the same person spamming, or repeat similar 
evidence; just because there is a large quantity of consistent tweets giving the impression of a 
consensus does not mean this is a truly compelling consensus with diverse reasoners and 
diverse original sources. When the reasoning aid was presented with the tweets, people 
became more sensitive to the cues of consensus quality and the influence of quantity was 
reduced, suggesting the aid is an effective reasoning tool. Future work should develop the 
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Note. Diagrams are by Goldstone and Son (2021). Two multidimensional scaling solutions for birds (A) and 




























Note. Diagram of topic space visualisation for the topic of “feminism” by Ajjour et al. (2017). The topic space 
of “feminism” is represented by the regular polygon and the argument topics surrounding feminism are shown 
on each vertex. The coloured dots represent specific pro and con arguments about feminism, with their spatial 
location in relation to the vertices symbolising their diversity.  
 
